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MARK TUSHNETt
An optimist is a person who, after being pushed out of a thirtieth-
story window, replies to a questioner on the fifteenth floor, "All right
so far!" The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't," a
collection of eleven essays on the Burger Court's decisions, is an opti-
mist's book. Its thesis is clear from the subtitle: liberals feared that the
Burger Court would gut the advances in civil liberties made during the
Warren era, but it has not. Defending this thesis requires that one both
identify the advances in civil liberties made by the Warren Court and
determine to what extent, if any, the Burger Court has undermined
them. If one agrees, as I do on balance, that no counterrevolution has
occurred, two additional questions need answers. Why didn't the coun-
terrevolution occur, given what we think we know about the political
predelictions of the Nixon and Reagan appointees? And if no counter-
revolution occurred, what did happen? This Review takes up those
questions. 2
I. THE WARREN COURT AND THE BURGER COURT
Each of the contributors to The Burger Court writes against a
usually implicit background of admiration for the accomplishments of
the Warren Court. The "no counterrevolution" thesis can be sustained
either by diminishing the grandeur of those accomplishments or by ex-
alting the accomplishments of the Burger Court. Ruth Bader Gins-
" Professor of Law, Georgetown University. B.A. 1967, Harvard University; J.D.
1971, M.A. 1971, Yale University.
1 (V. Blasi ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE BURGER COURT].
THE BURGER COURT is sponsored by the Society of American Law Teachers
(SALT), which will receive a portion of the royalties. For the past two years I have
been a member of the board of directors of SALT. The project was essentially com-
pleted before I became a member of the board.
' Because of my competence, I will discuss in this Review only those essays deal-
ing with constitutional law. I suspect-and regret-that other reviewers are just as
likely to slight the essays by Theodore St. Antoine on labor law and Richard Markovits
on antitrust law. But I certainly can't say anything about them that anyone ought to be
interested in reading.
(1257)
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burg's essay on sex discrimination3 takes the latter course. Consisting
largely of a summary of the Burger Court's decisions, the essay prop-
erly characterizes the Court's performance as "striking"4 and "spectac-
ular."5 Because "[e]vening up the rights, responsibilities, and opportu-
nities of men and women was not on the agenda of the Warren
Court,"' anything the Burger Court did would improve on the Warren
Court's performance. That remains true even though the Burger Court
has not done all that supporters of equal rights desired. Without depre-
cating the accomplishment, though, I want to mention something that I
discuss in more detail later: the Burger Court's decisions in gender dis-
crimination cases are shot through with class concerns.1 Perhaps be-
cause of how the essays divide up the terrain, class issues never fully
emerge from the background.
The other strategy for sustaining the book's thesis is pursued most
clearly by Yale Kamisar in an essay on criminal procedure.' He begins
by describing what the Warren Court did. It approved the use of the
intrusive investigative techniques often thought necessary in cases of
corruption and large-scale trafficking in drugs: undercover agents and
electronic surveillance.' It sought to impose the rules professionals in
the field had been using without difficulty-warnings and controlled
use of investigative stops-on all police departments."l Although
Kamisar does not say so, what the Warren Court did was to attempt to
remold all police forces on the model of the most thoroughly profession-
alized. If police departments actually conformed to the professional
model, their own adherence to professional norms, more than external
controls imposed by the courts, would guarantee the liberty of the
citizenry.
Kamisar identifies "two Burger Courts." '11 The first appeared in
the immediate aftermath of the Rehnquist and Powell appointments.
That Burger Court seemed to be bent on "gutt[ing]" 12 many of the
Warren Court's decisions. Here too Kamisar ventures no explanations,
' Ginsburg, The Burger Court's Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, in THE
BURGER COURT, supra note 1, at 132.
* Id. at 132.
* Id. at 151.
6Id. at 132.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-15.
8 Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger
Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in
THE BURGER COURT, supra note 1, at 62.
9 Id. at 63-64.
10 Id. at 64-67.




but it seems likely that this first Burger Court felt it essential to estab-
lish a different tone from its predecessor, to signal that the forces of law
and order had (re)gained control of the Court. Then, that signal clearly
sent, the second Burger Court proceeded to consolidate and even extend
the most enduring contributions of the Warren Court. It has demon-
strated a "strong commitment to the warrant clause""3 by insisting that
a valid warrant to search a bar and the bartender did not authorize a
search of the bar's customers14 and by holding that the police could not
routinely enter a home to make an arrest without a warrant.' 5 It has
developed a definition of "interrogation" that is sensitive to the values
served by the Miranda warnings 6 and has disinterred the doctrine lim-
iting interrogations after adversary proceedings have been initiated.
17
Kamisar rejects the claim that the decisions of the second Burger
Court look tolerable only because they have not fulfilled the worst fears
engendered by the decisions of the first Burger Court. 8 I am inclined
to agree, but do have some questions about Kamisar's analysis. First,
the second Burger Court appears to have come into its own around
1979. With Justice O'Connor replacing Justice Stewart, who had a
perverse attraction to the warrant clause,' 9 we may find yet a third
Burger Court in the making, one that resembles the first. Second, in
describing the Burger Court's first amendment decisions, Thomas
Emerson concludes that it "has lost that feeling for the dynamics of the
system . . . which was the hallmark of the Warren Court.""0 Some-
thing similar may characterize the criminal procedure decisions. The
Warren Court had a vision of policing as an integrated system all ele-
ments of which could be professionalized.2' The signals the Warren
Court sent to police officers and administrators about its expectations
may have been even more significant than its doctrinal innovations. In
this light the counterrevolution may have been completed by the first
Burger Court. It told police administrators and officers that they could
13 Id. at 79.
'4 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
15 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
16 Kamisar, supra note 8, at 87-89.
17 Id. at 90.
18 See id. at 81.
"I See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled by United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
20 Emerson, Freedom of the Press Under the Burger Court, in THE BURGER
COURT, supra note 1, at 26.
21 This vision is expressed in passages like that in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13
(1968), noting the limitations on the exclusionary rule "as a tool of judicial control,"
and in Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208 (1966), discussing the need for un-
dercover agents to investigate certain types of crimes.
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loosen up. The second Burger Court, on this interpretation, simply is-
sues occasional reminders that loosening up does not mean abandoning
all controls. The system of policing would be measurably less protective
of the citizenry under these circumstances, again no matter what the
particular holdings were. My guess is that changes in policing essen-
tially unrelated to judicial doctrine have imposed the kinds of con-
straints on police forces that the Warren Court sought. These con-
straints are not, of course, uniform throughout the country nor are they
sufficient as yet, but police forces have become more professionalized,
and the increasing racial integration of urban police forces has reduced
the kind of harassment to which judicial doctrine rarely speaks.22 If my
guess is correct, the counterrevolution, if any there was, came too late.
II. WHY THE COUNTERREVOLUTION DID NOT HAPPEN
Certainly it is true that the Burger Court has not (yet) fulfilled the
worst fears of those who admire the Warren Court. Yet we know from
what they say in their separate opinions that, as individuals, three to
five members of the Court have quite conservative political views that
sometimes affect their judicial performance. The Warren Court's ad-
mirers thought that in every case one or two others would be moved to
join the conservatives, producing a uniformly conservative body of law.
Why didn't that happen?
Anthony Lewis's foreword offers the conventional view that we
have come to expect of him. Sure, he says, the judges are political con-
servatives. But conservatives "are naturally committed to the doctrine of
stare decisis . . . [and it] follows logically that they should respect a
precedent once established, even though they opposed that result during
the process of decision.""8 Although I have my doubts, perhaps this is
so for "true [conservatives such] as Justice John Marshall Harlan." '24
But, apart from the lack of a counterrevolution, there really is not a lot
of evidence that Chief Justice Burger or Justice Rehnquist is a "true"
conservative. They are reactionaries, pure and simple, and, as I will
argue, they have indeed conducted a counterrevolution of sorts by infus-
ing the forms of adjudication developed by the Warren Court with a
new content.25
Martin Shapiro's. brilliant essay" comes closer to the mark. He
22 But see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (damaging
chokehold applied without provocation or justification).
23 Lewis, Foreword, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 1, at vii, viii.
24 Id.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 64-115.
2 Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for
[Vol. 132:1257
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argues that the Warren Court succeeded because its decisions constitu-
tionalized the political bargains struck by the New Deal coalition and
thus drew into the Court's fold the constituencies of the New Deal. 7
The Warren Court "was working out to its final conclusions a set of
values and policy preferences that had achieved an overwhelming con-
sensus produced by one of the few great crises and value reorderings in
American political history." '28 Viewing the Court as an actor in the
political universe, Shapiro suggests that the Court is unlikely to depart
very far, or for very long, from the views that hold sway in the rest of
the political system. Thus, as the New Deal consensus broke down,2
the Court, no less than Congress and the presidency, quite literally lost
its center. But a judicial counterrevolution was impossible because no
political counterrevolution had occurred.
I would push Shapiro's argument a little further than he does. As
a political scientist, Shapiro emphasizes that the Court's actions build
constituencies of support and opposition. 0 "In a world in which politi-
cal goals are not clear and policy consensus is diminished, the Supreme
Court is as unlikely as the rest of government to acquire a cheering
section." 1 But, cheering section or no, the Court is well advised to
avoid creating a constituency whose interests it never advances. If under
present circumstances the Court cannot rely for support on the constit-
uencies satisfied by an existing consensus, it can build its own coalition.
It does so by what Vincent Blasi calls its "rootless activism."32 Liberals
swallow hard and live with Buckley v. Valeo 3 because they are given
Washington v. Seattle School District No. P' in return and decide that
on balance it's worth it all. 85 Conservatives, who in general do not have
to swallow quite so hard, live with Mills v. Hableutze 8 because they
are given Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus3 7 and Buckley v.
Valeo in return and decide that on balance it's worth it all. (The differ-
ence in the significance of the cases suggests why the conservatives do
not have to swallow so hard and why the liberals' judgment about the
Values, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 1, at 218.
27 Id. at 219.
28 Id. at 237-38.
29 Id. at 237.
30 Id. at 219.
31 Id. at 237.
32 Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT,
supra note 1, at 198.
33 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
- 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
35 I question this judgment in Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. _
(forthcoming May 1984).
36 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
37 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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net benefits might be wrong.) As a result, no one is really cheering for
the Court, but it maintains a solid political base.
Although Shapiro does not make the argument in this way, his
analysis suggests that "rootless activism" is a political strategy well
adapted to preserving the Court's prerogatives in an era when any
"rooted" activism-revolutionary or counterrevolutionary-would gen-
erate intense opposition. Indeed, the argument can be extended a bit
more, as my earlier parenthetical comment hinted. A really clever
counterrevolutionary, faced with the political situation Shapiro de-
scribes, would conduct what Antonio Gramsci called a war of position.
Conceding small gains to the opposition in areas not of central concern,
the counterrevolutionary would attempt to secure somewhat larger
gains in areas closer to the center and would conduct lighting raids to
capture really important targets. 8 Mills v. Hableutzel, Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,9 and Buckley v. Valeo exemplify
each of the three categories. I will argue in the next section that, in the
end, the Burger Court's activism is rooted in exactly that way. There is
a counterrevolution under way, but the tactics are not what the liberals
expected.
There is, however, another reason for the failure of open counter-
revolution. Vincent Blasi offers a capsule description of the present
Court.4 He finds the center "intelligent, open-minded, and dedicated,"
and writes that "[a]n advocate faced with the challenge of changing
judicial minds with sound arguments would do better to attempt the
task in front of [Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens] than
almost any other [group of Justices] that has in the past held the bal-
ance of power on the Court.""' Perhaps so, but notice that the task is
one of changing minds by argument rather than supplying arguments
to support predispositions. Tony Amsterdam must do the former; Rex
Lee need only do the latter. I take it to be clear which position an
advocate would prefer to be in. If the center is strong, Blasi says, the
extremes are weak. Justice Brennan is "pragmatic . . . , more clever
than profound." '42 Justice Rehnquist is "more a debater than a thinker,
more a lawyer than a statesman. 4 3 Blasi says that Brennan and Rehn-
quist "could serve much better as coalition builders operating at the
S" That this analysis makes William Rehnquist sound like Ho Chi Minh is not
the only reason I find it attractive.
89 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
40 Blasi, supra note 32.
41 Id. at 210-11.
41 Id. at 211. I have to say that I do not really grasp the grounds for the depreca-
tory tone of the contrast. It strikes me as more clever than profound.
4' Id.; see also supra note 42.
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center of the Court's divisions," a role that Brennan played for the
Warren Court and that Rehnquist could play in the future.4'
What is striking about this is not the perfectly accurate observa-
tion that Brennan was a coalition builder,"5 nor the depressing sugges-
tion that Rehnquist could become one,4' but the failure to notice that
Brennan continues to be a coalition builder. I suspect that when the
history of the Supreme Court in the 1970's is written, it will reveal that
Brennan's skills contributed as much as anything to the absence of a
counterrevolution. For example, one can infer from Justice Brennan's
opinions in criminal procedure cases that he simply makes no effort to
build a five-person majority in most such cases and that he hoards his
resources to deploy them in the cases, criminal procedure or otherwise,
that he regards as truly important."
But one need not rely on an extended chain of inference from a
pattern of decisions. One need only read Plyler v. Doe.48 In traditional
lawyers' terms, Justice Brennan's opinion, holding unconstitutional a
Texas statute that denied a free public education to children of aliens
unlawfully in this country, is analytically indefensible.4 It jams to-
gether doctrines that other cases carefully held apart50 and refrains in a
footnote from deciding an issue that plays a crucial role in a later sec-
tion of the opinion.51 The opinion cannot be taken seriously as a piece
of legal analysis. But its very awkwardness reveals much about what
Justice Brennan really was doing: not writing a carefully crafted opin-
ion, not being profound, but building a coalition.
Here is what must have gone on in Justice Brennan's mind:52
I think that the statute embodies a dreadfully unwise
44 Id.; see also infra note 46.
4' See Hutchinson, Book Review, 81 MICH. L. REv. 922, 924 (1983).
41 I shudder at imagining the coalition in which Justice Rehnquist is the center.
47 I have been persuaded that, despite its generally high level of accuracy, B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 224-25 (1979), errs in identifying a
specific instance where the authors contend that Brennan consciously made such a judg-
ment. But the psychological picture seems to me entirely correct.
48 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
49 See Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe,
1982 Sup. CT. REv. 167.
"0 See 457 U.S. at 223-24 (in determining appropriate level of scrutiny to apply,
Court must take into account the importance of education and the severity of effect of
deprivation on alien children, as well as the costs to the nation likely to result).
51 Compare id. at 210 n.8 (Court need not reach question whether Texas statute
is preempted by federal law and policy) with id. at 224-26 (the states' power to deal
with illegal aliens is limited by Congress's plenary power to regulate immigration).
'2 Safe in the knowledge that it won't happen in my lifetime, I will contribute a
suitable amount to the Society of American Law Teachers, see supra note 1, if Justice
Brennan's papers do not confirm the proferred reconstruction of his thought processes.
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social policy. Justice Marshall certainly agrees with me. Fif-
teen years ago we might have said so openly, held the statute
unconstitutional, and have been done with it. But things
have changed, and I have to get three more votes. How can I
do that?
Well, one thing about this case is that it involves kids
who are being deprived of something largely because of what
their parents have done. In that way it is sort of like the
various illegitimacy cases we have decided.53 I know that the
analogy isn't exact, and our decisions in those cases are to
say the least not readily reconciled." But one thing is clear
from the cases. Justice Blackmun thinks that it's not a nice
thing to penalize kids for their parents' actions; indeed it's so
"not nice" as to be quite often unconstitutional.55 So if I
stick in some stuff about the analogy to illegitimacy, maybe I
can get Justice Blackmun to go along.
58
Who next? Justice Powell knows, from Virginia's expe-
rience during the period of massive resistance to desegrega-
tion, the severity of the social costs of wholesale denials of
education. Indeed, he said something along those lines in
San Antonio Independent School District No. 1 v. Rodri-
quez.57 So what I should do is stress that this case involves
absolute deprivations of education," and maybe Justice
Powell will go along. Of course, by throwing in the analogy
to illegitimacy cases and emphasizing the importance of edu-
cation, I may make it look like we are abandoning the rigid
two-tier approach to equal protection law to which Justice
53 See, e.g., Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
" Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (state law preventing illegiti-
mate children from recovering for the wrongful death of their mothers held unconstitu-
tional) with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding bar to illegitimates
taking under state intestate succession law).
55 See, e.g., Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (Blackmun, J., for the
Court) (conceding that strict scrutiny is not applicable to laws classifying on the basis
of legitimacy but writing that the Court has "had no difficulty in finding the discrimi-
nation impermissible on less demanding standards" when laws penalize illegitimate
children solely because of their illegitimacy); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result) (stating that a Louisiana
statute denying a father the ability to acknowledge his illegitimate children without
marrying their mother and thus barring the children from receiving survivorship bene-
fits as acknowledged dependents of their father denies equal protection to the illegiti-
mate children).
56 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
57 411 U.S. 1, 23-25, 29-30 (1973).
58 See 457 U.S. at 221-22.
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Powell is committed. So I guess I ought to stick in some lan-
guage expressly reaffirming our adherence to the Rodriquez
approach.59 Justice Marshall's not going to like that,"' but
he certainly will go no farther than writing a concurring
opinion.
Who's left? Justice Stevens has this bizarre attraction to
the idea that equal protection cases involving state regula-
tions affecting aliens are rather like preemption cases.6" No
one else will go along with a pure preemption analysis,
probably correctly, but I can stress the primary responsibility
of the national government for regulating aliens and for cre-
ating the problem Texas was dealing with in the first place.
Having done that, I can try a sort of reverse preemption ar-
gument, that the statute is unconstitutional kind of because
Congress didn't authorize it.62 That's five. What a weird
opinion this is going to turn out to be.
And so it is.
63
Precedents, politics, and personality thus have influenced the Bur-
ger Court's failed counterrevolution. But something surely has
happened.
III. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED
The Burger Court differs from the Warren Court along dimen-
sions that I label technical, cultural, and political. Although some of the
differences are only matters of degree, taken together they have signifi-
cant consequences.
Along the technical dimension, the most striking difference is the
" See id. at 221, 223; see also id. at 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 232-
33 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
0' See id. at 230-31 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-01 (1976) (Stevens,
J., for the Court) (dictum) ("We agree with the petitioners' position that overriding
national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the fed-
eral service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State."
(footnote omitted)); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) (Stevens, J., for the
Court) (dictum) ("[Ilt is the business of the political branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, rather than that of ... the States ... ,to regulate the conditions of entry and
residence of aliens.").
62 See id. at 218-19 & nn.17-18, 225-26.
63 For a case in which Justice Brennan wroie a concurring opinion emphasizing
the limits to the holding of the opinion of the Court-limits he seems likely to have
assisted in inserting-see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). For a case in
which it seems likely that Justice Brennan narrowed the holding and then joined the
dissent, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
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one to which Thomas Emerson alludes in referring to the Burger
Court's insensitivity to the systemic operations of institutions regulated
by law. 4 Emerson specifically mentions the Burger Court's "return[] to
a balancing test" in first amendment cases.65 There is no necessary con-
nection between relying on balancing and making relatively conserva-
tive decisions, nor between adopting bright-line rules and making rela-
tively liberal ones. It is not hard to imagine a speedy trial rule that
barred relief to anyone who had failed to make a timely demand or that
started the speedy trial clock running at the moment a demand was
made. 6 The grimness of that alternative undoubtedly explains why the
Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo60 7 was unanimous in adopting a
balancing test in which the demand and its timing were relevant but
never dispositive factors.6 That the stated doctrine requires balancing
disposes of no cases, nor does such a doctrine necessarily incline the
Court one way or the other. But the choice between balancing and
bright-line rules may well affect how actors outside the courts-police
officers, or government officials annoyed by the press-approach their
tasks. In the absence of a bright-line rule, those actors may be more
inclined to test the ill-defined limits of their authority. They may hope
that no litigation will result because of the ambiguity of the rule69 or
that years later some court will decide that on balance they were right.
In this light Kamisar's distinction between the two Burger Courts"0
takes on a new importance. The first Burger Court, it might be said,
accomplished its task by shifting from bright-line rules to balancing
tests. That sent the message to police officers. Of course, sometimes the
listeners are more aggressive than the broadcasters expected, which
Kamisar suggests is the explanation for some of the decisions by the
second Burger Court.7 1 But taking activity that never comes before the
' Emerson, supra note 20, at 26.
65 Id. at 4.
'6 Cf. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (the speedy trial clause
does not apply to the period between the dropping of military charges and indictment
on civilian charges).
67 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (opinion of the Court by Powell, J., joined by, inter alia,
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.).
's Id. at 530-33; see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983) (statements
made after Miranda-ized suspect initiated discussion to be judged by test of knowing
and intelligent waiver under all the circumstances, rather than being automatically
admissible).
9 This inclination may be bolstered by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982) (government official liable for damages caused by his or her violation of consti-
tutional rights only if official knew or should have known that action was unconstitu-
tional by reference to clearly established law).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 11-22.
'1 Kamisar, supra note 8, at 81.
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courts into account, the systemic impact of the shift may be more signif-
icant than one might think after reading the Court's opinions.
The cultural dimension of the Burger Court's shift from the War-
ren Court is explored in a superb essay by Robert Burt on the Burger
Court and the family. 2 By carefully exposing the often unstated as-
sumptions that animate decisions, Burt establishes that the Burger
Court prefers the assertion of communal authority, either through
traditional authoritarian families or by social agencies if the parents are
too spineless, over the autonomous decisions of families considered as
independent social units. 3 The most dramatic pair of cases here is In-
graham v. Wright, 4 which denied parents a say in the administration
of corporal punishment to their children in schools, and Parham v.
J.R., 5 which allowed parents to commit their unruly children to state
mental institutions without anyone (else) to speak for the children. Burt
contrasts this vision with the Warren Court's image of reason rather
than authority as what defines why and how the state may regulate
families. 6 Burt is not happy with either vision,7 7 but that is less impor-
tant here than the connection between this analysis and Shapiro's.
7 8
The Burger Court's family law cases show it defining its constituency
as adherents of traditional values, in contrast to the Warren* Court's
constituency of highly educated professionals. The shift illustrates one
of the cultural changes to which Shapiro's essay directs our attention.
On the borderland between culture and politics lies the Burger
Court's enthusiasm for the imperial presidency. Here we are likely to
be misled by the cases directly connected to Watergate,79 in which the
Court implicitly acknowledged that, at least with regard to Watergate,
Richard Nixon was indeed a crook.8 0 Maybe those cases should have
been covered in the criminal law chapter. After the passions of Water-
72 Burt, The Burger Court and the Family, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note
1, at 92.
73 Id. at 93.
74 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (use of corporal punishment in schools does not infringe
student's due process rights so long as it is within limits of the common law privilege
permitting justifiable and reasonable correction).
75 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The Court stated that the parents "retain a substantial, if
not a dominant role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse," but added,
"the child's rights and the nature of the commitment decision are such that parents
cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to have a
child institutionalized." Id. at 604.
78 Burt, supra note 72, at 103-07.
7 Id. at 111.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 26-39.
7, See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
"0 See generally B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 47, at 285-349.
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gate waned and the Court faced a case not involving Watergate itself, it
was willing to insulate the President from liability in damages for vio-
lating the Constitution."1 That decision fits into a general pattern of
enhancing the power of the President. 2 Moreover, the Court held un-
constitutional an effort by Congress to establish an administrative
agency, the Federal Election Commission, over which it thought, sensi-
bly enough, it ought to have more control than usual.8 3 In cases involv-
ing prosecutions of legislators, it has endorsed a relatively limited defi-
nition of the immunity provided by the speech and debate clause, 4 thus
making it easier for prosecutors appointed by the President to influence
the composition of Congress. Dames & Moore v. Regan8 5 approved an
exercise of presidential authority indistinguishable in its essentials from
that disapproved in the Steel Seizure Case."8
Dames & Moore shows how the considerations of judicial politics
that Shapiro emphasizes interact with substantive concerns. For, in ad-
dition to a rather greater enthusiasm for the imperial presidency these
days, Dames & Moore differs from the Steel Seizure Case primarily in
that the Court in 1981 could not possibly have gotten away with invali-
dating the Iranian Hostage Accords while the Court in 1952, facing a
politically weakened President who had-horror of horrors-trampled
on the prerogatives of property, could get away with what it did. 7 The
Court's more recent invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v.
Chadhas8 is equally illuminating. The decision is one for which there
is, so far as I can tell, no defensible justification in constitutional the-
ory. Jesse Choper's version of the popular theory authorizing judicial
81 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
82 For a paragraph on the issue, see Blasi, supra note 32, at 202. In addition to
the cases there mentioned, see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). The Snepp case is discussed by Emerson in his essay on
freedom of the press. See Emerson, supra note 20, at 12-14.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
' See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
85 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a discus-
sion of Dames & Moore, see Symposium: Dames & Moore v. Regan, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 977 (1981). Although the President's actions in these cases were similar, the con-
texts in which they acted possibly are distinguishable. In the Steel Seizure Case Con-
gress had indicated its intent that emergency strikes should not be handled by seizure.
See Labor Management Relations Act §§ 201-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-180 (1982). In
Dames & Moore the 'Court found implicit congressional support for the President's
actions in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §
1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979), and the Hostage Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). In my
view, however, the nature of the implicit support found by the Court in Dames .&
Moore suggests that the Steel Seizure Case Court could have found equally "persua-
sive" authority if it had chosen to uphold the President's actions.
87 See generally M. MARcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE (1977).
s 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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invalidation of legislation only where the political process is unlikely to
take account of affected interests 9 demonstrates that there are no politi-
cal obstacles justifying the Court's action in overturning deals that
Presidents had cut with Congress.96 Chief Justice Burger's opinion
hews to the interpretivist line and clinches its argument by underlining
the word "and.""1 But Chadha accomplished two things. First, the re-
sponse to the decision anticipated the "no counterrevolution" thesis. It
went roughly like this: "People were afraid that the Burger Court lack-
ed dedication to constitutional principles. The legislative veto case
shows that they were wrong. Admittedly, we're not sure why the legis-
lative veto is unconstitutional even after reading the opinions, but by
God it does show that they care about 'The Constitution.'" And sec-
ond, the decision endorsed a theory of the presidency that stresses the
prerogatives and powers of the office.92 Thus the Court satisfied two
constituencies: those favoring an imperial President and those espousing
a "strict construction" perspective.
The final, purely political dimension of what has happened sub-
stantially qualifies Vincent Blasi's argument that the Burger Court is
characterized by a rootless activism. To Blasi, the Burger Court has
been driven to that position by "the reactive nature of judicial re-
view." 9 3 It has been committed to respect for precedent and the cases it
confronts have been shaped by lower courts not as deeply conservative
as it is. 94 Further, the "rampant growth of government bureaucracy"
engendered a sense among the citizenry that the government was too
complex and impersonal. 95 It was natural for the Court to respond to
this concern by adopting simple constitutional solutions."' Finally, as
single issue politics came to distort the legislative process, the Court
responded, offering itself as an institution that could take an appropri-
ately comprehensive view of the problems.9" According to Blasi, the re-
sult has been a Court whose "activism has been inspired not by a com-
mitment to fundamental constitutional principles or noble political
" See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 101-04 (1980).
90 J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 2
(1980).
91 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
02 This is not to say that the decision enhances the President's power. As Choper
shows, Congress has many resources of its own. See J. CHOPER, supra note 90, at 281-
311. Chadha forces the deals between the executive and legislative branches to be rene-
gotiated from scratch, but it is not clear that the substantive outcomes of the negotia-
tions will change.
" Blasi, supra note 32, at 208.
94 Id. at 208-09.
95 Id. at 209.
" Id.
9 Id. at 210.
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ideals, but rather by the belief that modest injections of logic and com-
passion by disinterested, sensible judges can serve as a counterforce to
some of the excesses and irrationalities of contemporary governmental
decision-making." '98 The Burger Court's activism is "centrist. .. [and]
essentially pragmatic in nature, lacking a central theme or an
agenda."99
There is less here than it first seems, and the essay by Norman
Dorsen and Joel Gora'00 identifies what is missing. Dorsen and Gora
examine the Burger Court's free speech decisions and conclude that a
"new variable"-property-has been added to the mix of values pro-
tected by the first amendment.1"' Buckley v. Valeo,' °2 in its free speech
dimension, and the commercial speech cases, most notably Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'0 3 make
this explicit.'0 4
With this insight it is indeed possible to find the roots of the Bur-
ger Court's activism. They lie in the philosophy that the government as
a whole has the duty to protect the prerogatives of property' 5 and that
no part of the government has the duty to minimize the harms that lack
of property inflicts on those so unfortunate as not to have enough. Rob-
ert Bennett's essay on poverty law'0 6 not surprisingly presents the most
unrelievedly dark view of the Burger Court. The best he can do to
lighten the gloom is to include Califano v. Westcott,"'0 in which the
Court held unconstitutional a federal law extending public assistance to
intact families when the father was unemployed but not when the
mother was.'05 Califano v. Westcott is, however, more a gender case
than a poverty case.
But the poverty cases are not examples of the Burger Court's ac-
tivism anyway. More revealing are the free speech cases,0 9 Allied
98 Id. at 211.
99 Id.
100 Dorsen & Gora, The Burger Court and the Freedom of Speech, in THE BuR-
GER COURT, supra note 1, at 28.
101 Id. at 31.
102 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
los 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
104 See Dorsen & Gora, supra note 100, at 31-35.
105 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), holding that a
state may require owners of shopping centers to allow distribution of political materi-
als, is arguably to the contrary. Perhaps all it involves is a definition of the central
prerogatives of property.
1o0 Bennett, The Burger Court and the Poor, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note
1, at 46.
107 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
108 Bennett, supra note 106, at 52.
109 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,"n and the like that underscore the
Court's preoccupation with protecting property values. I believe that
the Court's sympathy to claims of presidential authority'- are cut from
the same pattern, in that such authority is seen as essential to guarantee
the position of the United States in the world economic and political
system, a system that on the whole functions to protect the position of
the privileged.
The gender discrimination cases are obviously more problematic.
But two points seem worth making. First, many of the relevant deci-
sions hold unconstitutional the exclusion of males from benefits made
available to women."U2 As Ginsburg explains, these decisions can read-
ily be rationalized as attacks on stereotypes of the proper female role.""
Those stereotypes are closely bound up with images of household work
as unproductive in contrast to "productive" work "outside" the house-
hold. They are therefore closely bound up with issues of class as
well." 4 The Court's willingness to question gender-role stereotypes
will have a limited impact so long as it fails to question class stereo-
types too. Yet that is precisely the limit of its activism. Second, because
of the present contours of political power in the United States, middle-
class women have been the primary direct beneficiaries of the women's
movement. That is not to say that working-class women have not bene-
fited, nor is it to assert that women's activists have been satisfied with
advances limited in that class-based way. But that fact of political life
makes it easier to understand why the Burger Court's activitism in gen-
der cases is at least not inconsistent with its concern for the prerogatives
It0 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (contracts clause of the Constitution prohibits states from
substantially impairing a contractual relationship, such as the pension provisions of an
employment contract, absent a purpose of resolving a broad, generalized economic or
social problem).
"I" See supra note 82; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
112 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama's statutory scheme impos-
ing alimony obligations on husbands but not on wives violates the equal protection
clause). Where the benefits are an essential part of the income that flows to a family
unit over the lifetime of its members, as are Social Security benefits, one cannot unam-
biguously define the gender bearing the burden. For example, in Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Court held unconstitutional a statute that provided a
benefit to female caretakers of a deceased wage earner's child but none to male caretak-
ers. From one view, this decision increased the income of fathers after their wives died.
From another, it increased the value of the fringe benefits included in wives' incomes
during their lifetimes.
113 Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 137-40.
114 The "inside/outside the home" dichotomy rests on the image of a world of
work, governed by class relations, contrasted to a world of domesticity, governed by
gender relations. For an examination of the instability of this dichotomy's applications
to legal topics, see Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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of property. And, of course, in its most direct confrontation with a
problem in which women's issues and class issues intersected, the Court
in Harris v. McRae' 15 forthrightly held that governments had no duty
to make abortions available to those who could not otherwise afford
them.
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court's interest in the prerogatives of property sug-
gests that its activism is more rooted than Blasi indicates. But does that
impair the "no counterrevolution" thesis? According to Blasi's assess-
ment of the Warren Court, it does. He writes, "[T]he Warren Court
was fired by a vision of the equal dignity of man," and though "on
many occasions" it "exhibited a pragmatic, compromising side," the
compromises "took place against a background in which the direction
of constitutional development was both clear and, to many, inspir-
ing." 6 The Burger Court is also pragmatic, but it has "no deep-seated
vision. 1 n7 Contrary to Blasi, I believe that it does have a vision, one
that, moreover, is also inspiring "to many."
But notice the difference between Blasi's and Kamisar's contrasts
between the Warren and Burger Courts. I believe that Kamisar is more
accurate. Here I revert to Shapiro's argument that the Warren Court
constitutionalized the policies of the New Deal. I have no doubt that
the New Deal program was, for its time and given the limits on effec-
tive transformative action in the United States, a major achievement,
providing an important foundation-or "safety net"-which has re-
cently been undermined (or unravelled). But that program was no less
pragmatic and compromising than any other political program. It is no
more a moral vision when adopted by the Supreme Court than it was
when Congress adopted it. Or, to put it another way, what Blasi views
as occasional compromises with a moral vision should rather be seen as
integral parts that serve to define precisely what that vision was.
Indeed it may be that the ultimate judgment on the Warren Court
is that "many" were able to read into its decisions a moral vision that
was not there. All the Burger Court has done, on this interpretation, is
to disabuse-or, in light of Blasi's position, provide us with the oppor-
tunity to disabuse-those readers of the illusion that the Warren Court
was a place where the party of humanity implemented its political pro-
15 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
116 Blasi, supra note 32, at 212.
11 Id.; see also id. at 216 (Burger Court has "powerful aversion to making fun-
damental value choices"; Warren Court "had a moral vision and an agenda").
[Vol. 132:1257
THE OPTIMIST'S TALE
gram. It turns out that there was in fact no counterrevolution because
there had been no revolution in the first place.11
11 This, I take it, is one reading of the thesis of A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978).
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